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We discuss recent work generalising the basic hybrid logic with the difference modality to
any reasonable notion of transition. This applies equally to both subrelational transitions
such as monotone neighbourhood frames or selection function models as well as those
with more structure such as Markov chains and alternating temporal frames. We provide a
generic canonical cut-free sequent system and a terminating proof-search strategy for the
fragment without the difference modality but including the global modality.
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1. Introduction
Recently, terminating tableaux and sequent calculi have been presented for the basic hybrid language with the global
modality [3,2] and also the difference modality [12]. In such systems a saturated branch may be used to construct a model,
for example by using the branch to construct a ‘nominal tree’ that represents a successor relation between nominals and
then quotienting that tree by equivalent nominals to obtain a graph.
The results mentioned above are based on extensions of the modal logic K with various features, such as the difference
modality or satisfaction operators. On the other hand, there are many more modal logics that one may want to enrich with
hybrid features, for instance probabilistic or graded modal logics. In this paper, we explore to what extent the tools and
techniques used to establish completeness, cut-elimination and termination for hybrid tableaux generalise to modal logics
that are not interpreted with respect to relational semantics.
Rather than answering this question on a case-by-case basis, we work in a more general (coalgebraic) setting in which
many (mostly non-normal) modal logics ﬁnd their natural place. The main idea behind the coalgebraic framework is to
isolate the notion of transition. In a relational framework, a transition from a particular world is determined by the set of its
successors. Similarly, when working with quantitative uncertainty, each state gives rise to a probability distribution over the
entire state space, in monotone modal logic, we have a set of monotone neighbourhoods, and the semantics of conditional
logics can be expressed by assigning selection functions to worlds.
It is fair to say that across this breadth of modal logics, hybrid extensions have only been considered for those logics that
can be interpreted with respect to relational semantics (with the exception of [11] where hybrid extensions of probabilistic
logics are considered, and our own work [15] that neither covers the global nor the difference modality). In particular,
graded hybrid logic is by now well understood, both from the perspective of modal logic [13] and description logic [6]. As
an illustration of the approach taken here, our semantics of graded logics arises not via Kripke structures (where successors
are counted) but via multigraphs: transitions are determined by multisets of successors (which induces the same satisﬁability
problem, but is stable under bisimulations): we will come back to this point later.
In general, the coalgebraic approach to modal logics takes the idea of structured transitions as primitive: models have
the shape S → T S where T is an unspeciﬁed notion of transition. To capture the examples above, we may take T S to be
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logics), the set of all monotone neighbourhoods (monotone modal logic) or indeed the set of all selection functions on S (to
interpret conditional logics). Crucially, all those notions of transition support a notion of both embeddings (or substructures)
and quotients. On a more abstract level, this manifests itself in the fact that we can apply the construction T not only to
sets, but also to functions in a meaningful way: if f : A → B is a function, so is T f : T A → T B . If, for example, T S = P(S)
is the set of all subsets of S , and f : A → B , we have that T f : T A → T B is direct image, i.e. T f (a) = { f (x) | x ∈ a}. In
other words, we actually have that T is not only a construction on sets, but in fact an endofunctor. Transition structures
or coalgebras are then functions γ : S → T S and the usual modal logic notions of polyadic modal operators, p-morphisms,
generated submodels, bisimulations and so forth all arise naturally as deﬁnitions parametric in the transition type T [8,22].
The idea of the coalgebraic approach to (modal) logics is now to assume that the semantics of a modal logics is given
with respect to an endofunctor T , without ever being explicit about how T is given concretely. As a consequence, all results
established in the coalgebraic framework simultaneously apply to a large number of structurally different modal logics.
Given such an endofunctor T , its coalgebras S
σ−→ T S play the role of frames. On the syntactical side, we ﬁx a set of modal
operators that can be interpreted with respect to T -coalgebras, and the study of coalgebraic modal logics now boils down
to extracting suitable coherence conditions between the syntax and the (coalgebraic) semantics that ensure properties such
as soundness, completeness or decidability.
In this paper, we study the effects of adding hybrid features and the difference modality to a modal logic equipped with
coalgebraic semantics. Subject to suitable coherence conditions, the main results presented here are completeness of both a
Hilbert-style and a sequent calculus with respect to the coalgebraic semantics. Crucially, the necessary coherence conditions
are precisely the same conditions that are also needed to guarantee completeness of the underlying modal logic (without
hybrid features) so that we have a large number of examples, including all those mentioned above, readily available. In
addition to that, we show termination of the sequent calculus in absence of the difference modality and conclude with
remarks concerning the compositionality of the coalgebraic framework, where we demonstrate how to synthesise a hybrid
logic for multi-agent systems with probabilistic behaviour. Technically, we prove completeness by adapting Schröder’s model
construction [21] to the case of hybrid logics with the difference modality. We then construct a sound sequent calculus and
prove its completeness by embedding the Hilbert-style proof system into the sequent calculus. Termination is then shown
by adapting Bolander’s technique [3,2]: we view every application of a modal rule as generating relational successors and
show termination by showing that this resulting nominal tree (that arises by recording which named states spawn new
states) is in fact ﬁnite. By instantiating our general results to concrete examples, we of course re-prove completeness and
termination for (standard) hybrid logics, but also for graded and probabilistic modal logic, for Pauly’s Coalition Logic [20],
and monotone modal logic.
We start by recalling the necessary coalgebraic and logical preliminaries, then present a complete Hilbert system for
hybrid coalgebraic logics. In the following section, we embed this system into a (sound, and cut-free) sequent system, giving
rise to cut-elimination. The last section concerns compositionality of coalgebraic logics, and we exemplify how to derive a
hybrid logic for games with probabilistic outcomes.
2. Preliminaries and notation
Throughout the paper, we ﬁx a modal similarity type Λ that consists of modal operators with arities, a set P of propo-
sitional variables and a set N of nominals. The set F(Λ) of Λ-formulas is given by the grammar
φ  F(Λ) ::= p | n | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | ♥(φ1, . . . , φn) |@nφ | Eφ | Dφ
where p ∈ P, n ∈ N and each ♥ ∈ Λ is an n-ary modal operator. The global modality is deﬁned Aψ = ¬E¬ψ and D = ¬D¬
is the dual of the difference modality. We use the standard deﬁnitions for the other propositional connectives →,↔ and ∨.
Brieﬂy, nominals n denote individual states in a model, @nφ stipulates that φ holds in the state that n names and Eφ holds
at a state of a model M if φ is satisﬁable in M . Finally, D is the difference modality and Dφ holds at a state if there exists
a distinct state where φ holds.
If S is a set of formulas, we write Prop(S) for the set of propositional combinations of formulas in S . By a clause we
always mean a disjunctive clause. We call a formula global if it is a propositional combination of formulas that are preﬁxed
with @ or E. In other words, the set G(Λ) of global Λ-formulas is given by
G(Λ) = Prop({@nφ ∣∣ φ ∈ F(Λ), n ∈ N}∪ {Eφ ∣∣ φ ∈ F(Λ)})
The semantics of Λ-formulas is given with respect to Λ-structures that consist of an endofunctor T : Set → Set, deﬁning
the nature of the transitions, together with an associated n-ary predicate lifting ♥ for each n-ary modality ♥ ∈ Λ. Intu-
itively T deﬁnes the transition behaviour whereas Λ deﬁnes the modal operators we use to observe such transitions. An
n-ary predicate lifting is a set-indexed family of functions
(
♥X : P(X)n → P(T X)
)
X∈Set
that satisﬁes the naturality condition
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(
f −1 × · · · × f −1)= (T f )−1 ◦ ♥Y
for all functions f : X → Y . For the categorically minded, each ♥ is a natural transformation of type Qn → Q ◦ T op
where Q : Setop → Set is the contravariant powerset functor. For any such predicate lifting ♥ we may consider its dual ♥,
interpreted via
♥X (S1, . . . , Sn) = T X \ ♥X (X \ S1, . . . , X \ Sn)
and it follows from this that ♥(φ1, . . . , φn) arises syntactically as ¬♥(¬φ1, . . . ,¬φn) as usual, see the deﬁnition of the
semantics below. We usually keep the deﬁnitions of the predicate liftings implicit and identify Λ-structures with the un-
derlying endofunctor. However it is worth reiterating that we cover two degrees of freedom: both the transition structure T
and our modal operators Λ may be varied.
The notion of a predicate lifting is the central deﬁnition in coalgebraic modal logic. There are two important points
worth making at this juncture:
(i) The above deﬁnition of a predicate lifting arises naturally by requiring bisimilar states to have identical logical theories.
Take T = P so that T -coalgebras are Kripke frames. Using the standard deﬁnition, φ holds in a state x of some Kripke
frame γ : X → P X iff its successor set γ (x) is a subset of the semantics φ ∈ P X of φ. In other words φ holds
at x iff the transition at x i.e. γ (x) ∈ T X lies inside a particular subset s ⊆ T X of ‘good’ transitions, where s itself is
determined by a subset S ⊆ X , namely φ.
More generally for any transition type T we may think of a unary modal operator ♥ as a family of functions ♥X :
P X → PT X which takes a predicate over X as input and provides a collection of good transitions as output. In any T -
coalgebra γ : X → T X , we say ♥φ holds at x iff γ (x) lies in ♥X (S) where S is the semantics of φ. The crucial property
we require of these functions ♥X is to guarantee invariance with respect to coalgebraic behavioural equivalence [16],
which specialises to the usual notion of bisimulation in the case of Kripke frames: if two states x, y of possibly different
coalgebras are bisimilar then ♥φ holds at x iff ♥φ holds at y. One can show that this requirement is equivalent to the
condition ♥X ◦ f −1 = (T f )−1 ◦ ♥Y for all sets X, Y and functions f : X → Y . The more general n-ary deﬁnition
above can be derived in a similar manner.
(ii) There is a bijection between the n-ary predicate liftings for T and the subsets of the set T (2n) where 2 = {,⊥}. This bijection
is an instance of the Yoneda lemma as observed in [22].
Importantly this means we also have a really good grasp of what a coalgebraic modal operator for T actually is. For
example  corresponds with the subset {∅, {}} of P2 whereas  corresponds with {{}, {⊥,}}, see [22]. We provide
this bijection for the case n = 1.
Given any U ⊆ T2, we deﬁne a unary predicate lifting ♥UX : P X → PT X as follows. Any S ⊆ X deﬁnes an indicator
function 1XS : X → 2, to which we may apply our functor T yielding a function T1XS : T X → T2. Then ♥UX (S) is
deﬁned as (T1XS )
−1(U) i.e. we apply the inverse image of T1XS to U . One can check that the naturality condition
♥UX ◦ f −1 = (T f )−1 ◦ ♥U Y holds for all functions f : X → Y . Conversely if ♥ is a unary predicate lifting for
T then deﬁne U ⊆ T2 as ♥2({}). One can show these two operations between unary predicate liftings for T and
subsets of T2 form a bijection.
This characterisation of modal operators might seem rather restrictive, for example graded modalities do not arise as
predicate liftings for T = P because e.g. ∃>2X (S) = {Y ∈ P X: |S ∩ Y | > 2} doesn’t satisfy the naturality condition. Thus
they are not admissible as coalgebraic modal operators for Kripke frames. However graded modalities do arise as predicate
liftings if one endows the type of transition T with more structure, which is achieved by taking T to be the multiset
functor so that T -coalgebras are multigraphs. This is a consequence of the fact that coalgebraic logics are bisimulation
invariant, which is no longer the case for graded modalities. Roughly speaking, if a modality only talks about the behaviour
over the next step then it should be axiomatisable exclusively using certain formulae known as rank-1 formulae [24]. Any
such axiomatisation induces a functor in which the modal operator arises as a predicate lifting, see [24]. In this sense one
can expect coalgebraic semantics to cover all such modalities, often by enriching the behaviour type, as for example the
multigraph semantics of graded modal logic. Although there are plenty of modalities which can talk about behaviour more
than one-step away, these are still essentially built out of coalgebraic modal operators. One might add ﬁxpoints [14] or
frame conditions [18] but the underlying ‘one-step’ coalgebraic modal operators always lurk beneath. We now deﬁne the
coalgebraic semantics.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Given an endofunctor T : Set → Set, a T -coalgebra is a pair (C, γ ) where C is a set (of states, or worlds)
and γ : C → T C is a (transition) function. Morphisms f : (C1, γ1) → (C2, γ2) of T -coalgebras are functions f : C1 → C2 such
that γ2 ◦ f = T f ◦ γ1, hence the class of T -coalgebras forms a category. A T -model is a triple (C, γ ,π) where (C, γ ) is a
T -coalgebra and π : P ∪ N → P(C) is a hybrid valuation, i.e. a mapping so that π(n) is a singleton set for all n ∈ N. If we
assume that T extends to a Λ-structure, we interpret Λ-formulas over a T -model M = (C, γ ,π) using the standard clauses
for propositional connectives together with:
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(
φ1M , . . . ,φn
)
(M, c) |@iφ ⇐⇒
(
M, c′
) | φ where π(i) = {c′}
(M, c) | Eφ ⇐⇒ (M, c′) | φ for some c′ ∈ C
(M, c) | Dφ ⇐⇒ (M, c′) | φ for some c′ ∈ C, c′ = c
where φM = {c ∈ C | (M, c) | φ} is the truth-set of φ ∈ F(Λ). We say φ ∈ F(Λ) is valid and write | φ if φ holds in every
state of every T -model.
Example 2.2.
(i) Coalgebras for the powerset functor P are Kripke frames γ : X → P X , mapping a state to the set of its successors.
Given a function f : X → Y then P f : P X → PY is simply the direct image of f . The parametric maps X (S) =
{Y ⊆ X: S ∩ Y = ∅} and (S) = {Y ⊆ X: Y ⊆ S} are indeed natural transformations from Q to Q ◦ Pop . In terms of
PP2,  corresponds with {{}, {⊥,}} and  corresponds with {∅, {}}.
(ii) Coalgebras for the contravariant powerset functor composed with itself: Nbhd = Q ◦ Q, are neighbourhood-frames.
Given any function f : X → Y then Nbhd f = ( f −1)−1 : NbhdX → NbhdY is the inverse image of the inverse image i.e.
Nbhd f (U) = {U ⊆ Y : f −1(U ) ∈ U}. Nbhd-coalgebras are maps γ : X → PP X . The neighbourhood box arises as the
predicate lifting X (S) = {N ∈ NbhdX: S ∈ N}.
(iii) Let Mon : Set → Set be the monotone-neighbourhood functor, which is the subfunctor of Nbhd with MonX = {N ∈
NbhdX: A ⊇ B ∈ N implies A ∈ N} i.e. the neighbourhoods that are upwards closed. For functions f : X → Y , Mon f is
the restriction of Nbhd f to MonX . Then Mon-coalgebras are monotone neighbourhood-frames and the neighbourhood
box above restricts to these coalgebras.
(iv) Consider the covariant functor Cond : Set → Set with CondX := QX → P X so that → : Setop ×Set → Set is the function
space functor. On objects A → B consists of the functions from A to B and given functions f : Y → X and g : X ′ → Y ′
then f → g : (X → X ′) → (Y → Y ′) is deﬁned ( f → g)(α) = g ◦ α ◦ f . Then Cond-coalgebras are selection function
models in the sense of [4] and the binary modality · ⇒ · arises as the binary predicate lifting S1⇒X S2 = { f : P X →
P X: f (S1) ⊆ S2}.
(v) The subfunctor P2 of P is deﬁned P2X = {S ⊆ X: |S| 2}, given f : X → Y P2 f is the restriction of the direct-image
to P2X . P2-coalgebras are Kripke frames which have at most two successors.  and  then arise as predicate
liftings which are the restrictions of those deﬁned on P .
(vi) Examples including coalitional games (or alternating temporal frames), Markov chains and multigraphs can be found in
[25]. For some less well-traveled examples including the free band-monoid and the non-repetitive list functor see [22];
also a general perspective which leads to many other examples can be found in [9].
3. Complete axiomatisation of hybrid coalgebraic logic
In the previous section, we have introduced the semantics of coalgebraic hybrid logic with respect to arbitrary T -models.
To match this generality on the level of axiomatisation, our treatment is parametric in a set of one-step rules that embodies
the notion of transition represented by T . Intuitively, coalgebraic semantics assigns a transition γ (c) ∈ T C to every state
c ∈ C of a coalgebra (C, γ ). On the logical side, the relation between states and successors is embodied by one-step rules
that allow us to infer properties of successor states in terms of properties of states. In fact every rank-1 formulae has an
equivalent one-step rule and conversely [21]. With the view of using these rules both in a setting of Hilbert and Gentzen
calculi, we adopt the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let P be a countably inﬁnite collection of propositional variables and given any set of formulae S let ¬S =
{¬φ | φ ∈ S} and Λ(S) = {♥(φ1, . . . , φn): φi ∈ S,♥ ∈ Λ is n-ary}. A one-step rule over a similarity type Λ takes the form
Γ1 · · · Γn
Γ0
where Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊆ P ∪¬P, Γ0 ⊆ Λ(P)∪¬Λ(P) and every propositional variable that occurs in the conclusion of a rule also
occurs in the premise. Each Γi is a set (rather than a multiset) that is represented by a comma separated list, understood
as the disjunction of its elements.
We associate the following rules to the structures introduced in Example 2.2.
Example 3.2.
(i) The following standard ruleset can be used to axiomatise Kripke frames:
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¬a1, . . . ,¬an,b (n 0)
(ii) We take the following ruleset for neighbourhood frames, note the box is now the neighbourhood box:
¬a,b a,¬b
¬a,b
(iii) For monotone neighbourhood frames we use the rules:
¬a,b
¬a,b
(iv) These one-step rules are the well-known ones for minimal selection function models:
¬c, c′ ¬c′, c
¬(c ⇒ a), c′ ⇒ a
¬a1, . . . ,¬an,b
¬(c ⇒ a1), . . . ,¬(c ⇒ an), c ⇒ b (n 0)
(v) For P2-coalgebras, suppose the conclusion is ¬a1, . . . ,¬an,b1, . . . ,bm where n  0, m  1 and M = {1, . . . ,m}.
Then consider any U ⊂ PM such that for every subset S ⊆ M either S ∈ U or M \ S ∈ U but not both. For every such
U = {S1, . . . , Sk} there is a rule:
{¬a1, . . . ,¬an} ∪ {b j: j ∈ S1} · · · {¬a1, . . . ,¬an} ∪ {b j: j ∈ Sk}
¬a1, . . . ,¬an,b1, . . . ,bm
(vi) The rulesets for multigraphs and discrete Markov chains are more complex than those given above, see [25].
We use one-step rules to capture those aspects of models that are speciﬁc to any concretely given Λ-structure. Deduc-
tion in coalgebraic hybrid logics is given relative to a set R of one-step rules, and mostly standard axioms that relate to
nominals, the global modality and the difference modality.
(KD) D(p → q) → Dp → Dq (SymD) p → DDp
(TransD) DDp → (p ∨ Dp) (NomD) Di ↔ ¬i
(ED) Ep ↔ p ∨ Dp (E@) @i p ↔ E(i ∧ p)
(MobEi) Ep →
(♥(q1, . . . ,qn) ↔ ♥(q1, . . . ,Ep ∧ qi, . . . ,qn)) (1 i  n)
Of the above axioms only (MobEi) requires comment, the others being standard. One may view it either as a generali-
sation of the back-axiom @i p →@i p, the inclusion axiom p → Ep or in terms of the difference modality p → p ∨ Dp.
It expresses the fact that if the formula Eφ holds in some state of a model then it must hold in all states. We require this
axiom for every ♥ ∈ Λ.
With the help of the above axioms, the derivability predicate in coalgebraic hybrid logic relative to a set R of one-step
rules is given as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.3. Suppose R is a set of one-step rules, we write R φ if φ is an element of the least set that contains:
(i) all substitution instances of propositional tautologies
(ii) all hybrid substitution instances (where nominals must be substituted for nominals) of the axioms above
and moreover is closed under:
(i) modus ponens
(ii) necessitation for D i.e. φDφ for any formula φ
(iii) the Name rule j→θ
θ
where j is a nominal not occurring in θ
(iv) substitution instances of rules in R.
We omit the subscript R in R if it is clear from the context.
The above axioms and rules (with the exception of MobE) are the same as for hybrid logic over Kripke frames
[1, Chapter 7.3]. The main goal of this section is to establish soundness and completeness of coalgebraic hybrid logic with
the difference modality, parametric in a Λ-structure T i.e. in the type of transition and also the modal observations we
may make over them. This T appears logically as a set R of one-step rules which must in some sense be complete. The
completeness condition that we need on the ruleset is identical to that which guarantees completeness in absence of hybrid
features [25]. Intuitively speaking, these one-step rules allow us to propagate reasoning about states (the premises) to rea-
soning about successors (the conclusion). Later we will exhibit a very simple process one can use to ‘hybridise’ this ruleset
for direct use in a sequent system.
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evaluation of a propositional formula φ in the boolean algebra P X under the valuation τ , and (X, τ ) | φ if φX,τ = X .
Similarly if ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(P)), the one-step semantics ψT X,τ ⊆ T X of ψ relative to τ is the evaluation of ψ in the boolean
algebra PT X via the inductive extension of the assignment:
♥(p1, . . . , pn)T X,τ = ♥X
(
τ (p1), . . . , τ (pn)
)
to the whole of Prop(Λ(P)). We call ψ one-step valid relative to τ if ψT X,τ = T X and write (T X, τ ) | ψ in this case.
Example 3.5.
(i) Given φ = ¬p ∨ q and τ : P → P X then τ (p) ⊆ τ (q) implies (X, τ ) | φ. In fact the converse also holds.
(ii) If T = P , ψ = ¬p ∨q and τ (p) ⊆ τ (q) then ψP X,τ = (P X \ X (τ (p))) ∪ X (τ (q)) = P X i.e. (P X, τ ) | ψ .
To say that some ψ is one-step valid relative to τ : P → P X means that every transition t ∈ T X lies in the set ψT X,τ . It
follows by the coalgebraic semantics that for every coalgebra γ : X → T X , ψ holds in every state of the T -model (X, γ , τ ).
However, we shall see that, due to the structure of predicate liftings, it is not the codomain P X of τ or the particular
sets Q = {τ (p): p occurs in ψ} that matters. Instead it is the relative boolean structure of the sets in Q which causes
(T X, τ ) | ψ . Understanding the boolean structure from which each one-step validity arises leads to an axiomatisation of
the relevant notion of transition.
Notice in the above examples that we did not explicitly deﬁne the maps τ : P → P X . Instead the relationship between
the sets τ (p) and τ (q) determined that ψ was one-step valid relative to τ . Such structure can be captured by a propositional
formula, which in this case is ¬p ∨ q. Generally speaking, to say that ψ is one-step valid relative to τ means there is a
certain propositional formula φ with propositional variables from ψ , which captures the structure of τ in the following
sense:
(i) (X, τ ) | φ
(ii) for any τ ′ : P → PY if (Y , τ ′) | φ then (T Y , τ ′) | ψ
So not only does φ evaluate to  in the boolean subalgebra of P X generated by Q = {τ (p): p occurs in ψ} but it also
precisely captures the boolean structure that makes ψ one-step valid relative to τ . Let V consist of those ﬁnitely many
propositional variables that occur in ψ , then deﬁne φ as the conjunction of all propositional clauses χ over V such that
(X, τ ) | χ . Such a φ =∧i χi satisﬁes the properties (i) and (ii) above, as in proved in [21, Theorem 18]. We have just seen
that any ψ one-step valid relative to τ induces a one-step rule which is one-step sound:
Deﬁnition 3.6. We say that a one-step rule Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 ∈ R is one-step sound if (X, τ ) |∨Γi for all i = 1, . . . ,n implies
that (T X, τ ) |∨Γ0, for any valuation τ : P → P X . A set R of one-step rules is one-step sound if all of its rules are.
One says that ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(P)) is one-step derivable relative to τ : P → P X if the collection of clauses:
S(X, τ ) =
{∨
Γ0σ
∣∣ Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 ∈ R, σ : P → P, (X, τ ) |∨Γiσ , 1 i  n
}
propositionally entail ψ .
A ruleset R is one-step complete if for any valuation τ every one-step valid clause ψ relative to τ is one-step derivable
relative to the τ . Moreover we say R is one-step cut-free complete if additionally there exists a single clause in S(X, τ ) which
propositionally entails ψ . That is, R is one-step cut-free complete if there exists a single clause χ ∈ S(X, τ ) such that χ is
a subclause of ψ .
Given R is one-step sound it follows that if ψ is one-step derivable relative to τ then it is also one-step valid relative
to τ . One can now understand why the above concepts have been given these particular names: one-step soundness implies
that one-step derivability implies one-step validity. In fact one-step sound one-step rules are sound, which allows us to prove
the soundness of our derivability predicate R:
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that R is a one-step sound set of one-step Λ-rules. Then | φ whenever  φ for all formulas φ ∈ F(Λ).
Proof. The soundness of all axioms and rules aside from R is standard. For any one-step rule Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 in R and
substitution σ , assume for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} that | ∨Γiσ then we must show that | ∨Γ0σ follows from one-step
soundness. In any T -model M = (C, γ ,π), ﬁrst note that (M, c) | ♥(φ1, . . . , φn) iff γ (c) ∈ ♥C (φ1M , . . . ,φnM)
iff c ∈ γ−1(♥C (φ1M , . . . ,φnM)). Since γ−1 is a boolean morphism it follows that for any clause Γ0σ one has
(M, c) |∨Γ0σ iff c ∈ γ−1(∨Γ0T C,τ ) where τ (p) = σ(p)M . Our initial assumption implies that for every i in {1, . . . ,n}
(C, τ ) |∨Γi hence by one-step soundness ∨Γ0T C,τ = T C , therefore ∨Γ0σ holds globally. Since the model M was ar-
bitrary
∨
Γ0σ is a valid formula. 
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It is the critical condition required to prove completeness with respect to our hybrid coalgebraic semantics.
Lemma 3.8. (See [21].) For every T : Set → Set and set of predicate liftings Λ for T there exists a set of rules which is both one-step
sound and one-step complete.
The proof follows by showing that the set of all one-step sound rules is one-step complete. Hence the subsequent
completeness proof, which relies upon one-step completeness works for all choices T and Λ, without explicitly providing
the ruleset. In practice we have found that the relevant rulesets may be described in a compact manner e.g. all rulesets in
Example 3.2 are one-step cut-free complete.
Although one-step completeness is suﬃcient for the completeness result that follows, we shall in fact assume one-step
cut-free completeness at the crucial point in the completeness proof. This is not really an issue since it is always possible
to close a one-step complete ruleset such that it is cut-free, see [17]. At any rate we will need this condition to obtain
cut-freeness of our generic sequent system later.
We tackle completeness by modifying the ﬁnite model construction found in [21]. Since coalgebraic modal logics need
not be compact (we may e.g. choose T X = {Y ⊆ X | Y ﬁnite} to interpret the modal logic K ), we show completeness by
constructing ﬁnite satisfying models from consistent formulae. As usual a formula φ ∈ F(Λ) is inconsistent iff R ¬φ, and
consistent otherwise. For the remainder of the section we ﬁx a consistent formula φ0 ∈ F(Λ). For each Dχi that occurs
as a subformula of φ0 we introduce a new nominal ni . We also introduce a new nominal t0. The extra nominals ni will
be used in the truth lemma later where, for any maximally consistent set containing Dχi we must obtain a distinct one
containing χi . The nominal t0 will name the state where φ0 holds.
Deﬁnition 3.9. The closure of φ0 denoted Σ(φ0) contains the set S = {@t0φ0} ∪ {ni: Dχi a subformula of φ0} and is closed
under subformulae (where n counts as a subformula of @nφ), the propositional connectives ¬, ∧ and preﬁxing by E and @n
where n occurs as a subformula of S . We deﬁne G(φ0) to consist of the global formulae that lie in Σ(φ0) and let MG(φ0)
denote the maximally consistent subsets of G(φ0).
Lemma 3.10. Σ(φ0) is ﬁnite modulo logical equivalence.
Proof. First note @-operators commute with propositional connectives and this, together with @iEp ↔ Ep and @i@ j p ↔
@ j p, allows us to assume they preﬁx subformulae of S . Furthermore the theorems  E(p ∨ q) ↔ Ep ∨ Eq as well as 
E(p ∧ Eq) ↔ Ep ∧ Eq and  E(p ∧ ¬Eq) ↔ Ep ∧ ¬Eq ensure that we can ﬂatten nested Es. Since S is ﬁnite it then follows
that Σ(φ0) is ﬁnite up to logical equivalence. 
Hence there are only ﬁnitely many maximally consistent subsets of Σ(φ0), so MG(φ0) is certainly ﬁnite. Now pick a
maximally consistent K ∈ MG(φ0) with:
(i) @t0φ0 ∈ K
(ii) EDχi →@niχi ∈ K for every subformula of φ0 of the form Dχi
We need to show that such a K exists – intuitively there are no conditions on the introduced nominals ni so we can
force them to name a state where χi holds.
Lemma 3.11. The collection of formulae (i) and (ii) are consistent, hence a K ∈ MG(φ0) containing them exists.
Proof. Since φ0 is consistent we have @t0φ0 consistent via (Name) since t0 doesn’t occur in φ0. Now assume for a contradic-
tion that @t0φ0 ∧
∧
i(EDχi → @niχi) is inconsistent, hence  @t0φ0 →
∨
i(EDχi ∧@ni¬χi). One can show that if  θ ∨@iψ
where i only occurs in the single @i , then  θ ∨ Aψ – again we use the (Name) rule. We can apply this result itera-
tively together with propositional reasoning to obtain  @t0φ0 →
∨
i(EDχi ∧ A¬χi) since the ni only appear once. From EDp ∧ A¬p → ⊥ it follows that  ¬@t0φ0, contradicting the consistency of @t0φ0. Since the formulae are consistent we
can apply the Lindenbaum lemma to obtain K as a maximally consistent subset of the ﬁnite set Σ(φ0). 
Due to ﬁniteness modulo logical-equivalence we can think of K as a ﬁnite set of equivalence classes and thus can write∧
K for a ﬁnite conjunction. Having obtained this global theory K we construct another ﬁnite collection of maximally
consistent sets MK :
Deﬁnition 3.12. Let M(φ0) be the ﬁnitely many maximally-consistent subsets of Σ(φ0), then we deﬁne MK = {Φ ∈
M(φ0): K ⊆ Φ}. MK will be the carrier of our satisfying model for φ0. We call a ﬁnite T -model MK = (MK , γ ,π) a
subcanonical model if π is the canonical valuation π(v) := {Φ ∈ MK : v ∈ Φ} and evaluates nominals as singleton sets and
γ : MK → T (MK ) satisﬁes the existence property:
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γ (Φ) ∈ ♥MK
(
ψ1MK , . . . ,ψnMK
) ⇐⇒ ♥(ψ1, . . . ,ψn) ∈ Φ
where ψi= {Φ ∈ MK : ψi ∈ Φ}.
If a subcanonical model exists then we can use it prove a truth lemma and hence obtain completeness. In fact the
existence property is precisely the inductive step for modalities ♥(φ1, . . . , φn) in the truth lemma, as one can check by
considering the coalgebraic semantics of ♥. First we conﬁrm that the canonical valuation is a hybrid valuation.
Lemma 3.13. The canonical valuation evaluates nominals as singleton sets.
Proof. Assume Φ,Ψ ∈ MK and that we have a nominal i ∈ Φ ∩ Ψ . It then follows that ψ ∈ Φ ⇐⇒ @iψ ∈ Φ ⇐⇒ @iψ ∈
Ψ ⇐⇒ ψ ∈ Ψ . The ﬁrst and last bi-implications hold because  i ∧ p → @i p is derivable and the language is closed under
@-preﬁxing, the middle one follows because every member of MK shares the same global formulae K . 
It remains to show that there exists a coalgebra structure γ satisfying the existence property. We ﬁrst prove two auxiliary
lemmas:
Lemma 3.14. If Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 ∈ R then for any formula ψ and language substitution σ : P → F(Λ), the following rule is sound:
 Eψ → Γ1σ · · ·  Eψ → Γnσ
 Eψ → Γ0σ
Proof. Let V be the collection of propositional variables that occur in Γi where 1  i  n. We may assume there is some
clause χ containing all the variables in V which isn’t equal to any Γi , otherwise the premise is a tautology so  Γ0 and the
result follows. Deﬁne the substitution τ : P → F(Λ) by τ (v) = σ(v)∨¬Eψ if v occurs negatively in χ and τ (v) = σ(v)∧Eψ
otherwise. Then every Γiτ where i  1 contains the literal ¬Eψ and other literals take the form σ(v) or σ(v) ∧ Eψ , it
follows from the premises of the above rule that for every i in {1, . . . ,n} we have  Γiτ and applying our sound one-step
rule we obtain  Γ0τ . Now note that by repeated application of (MobEi) for any modal operator ♥ and its dual ♥ it is
possible to derive  Ep → (♥q ↔ ♥q′), where the components q′i of q′ may freely equal qi ∧ Ep or qi ∨ ¬Ep. Using this
together with  Γ0τ , it follows by propositional reasoning that  Eψ → Γ0σ as required. 
Lemma 3.15. Let χ ∈ Prop(P) and σ : P → Σ(φ0) then ∧ K → χσ iff (MK , θ) | χ where θ : P → P(MK ) is deﬁned θ(v) :=
{Φ ∈ MK : σ(v) ∈ Φ}.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the propositional formula χ . We prove that ψ ∈ Σ(φ0) lies in every Φ ∈ MK iff
∧ K → ψ : from left to right assume ∧ K → ψ then ∧ K ∧ ¬ψ consistent so by the Lindenbaum lemma there is some
Φ ∈ MK with ψ /∈ Φ . The other direction follows from the fact that ∧ K lies (modulo logical equivalence) in every member
of MK and maximally consistent sets are closed under modus ponens. This proves the base case where χ is a propositional
variable, the inductive cases for ∧ and ¬ follow by similar standard arguments. 
We are now ready to prove that a coalgebra structure satisfying the existence property [21, Lemma 28] does indeed
exist.
Lemma 3.16. Suppose our ruleset R is one-step cut-free complete, then there exists a γ : MK → TMK satisfying the existence
property.
Proof. For a contradiction assume γ (Φ) fails to exist as required for some Φ ∈ MK . For brevity let C = MK then the




φ1, . . . ,φn
)∩ ⋂
♥(φ1,...,φn)/∈Φ
T C \ ♥C
(
φ1, . . . ,φn
)= ∅
Let us complement this equation. Then, if we replace each ♥(φ1, . . . ,φn) by ♥(φ1, . . . ,φn) and likewise each
T X \ ♥(φ1, . . . ,φn) by ¬♥(φ1, . . . ,φn) we obtain a clause ψ∗ , where we will now think of the subsets φi as
propositional variables. This ψ∗ is one-step valid with respect to (C, τ ) where τ assigns the φ thought of as propositional
variables to themselves as subsets of C . By one-step cut-free completeness there exists a single rule Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 such that:
(i) for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} one has (C, τ ) | Γiτ and (ii) Γ0τ is a subclause of ψ∗ . By Lemma 3.15, (i) implies: ∧ K → Γiκ
for 1  i  n where κ is deﬁned κ(φ) = φ. Finally we may apply Lemma 3.14 to obtain ∧ K → Γ0κ , which using (ii)
together with
∧
K ∈ Φ contradicts the consistency of Φ . 
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ness.
Lemma 3.17. If (MK , γ ∗,π) is a subcanonical model then for everymaximally consistent setΦ ∈ MK and every formulaψ ∈ Σ(φ0):
Φ | ψ ⇐⇒ ψ ∈ Φ .
Proof. The case for the boolean connectives, propositional variables and nominals is standard and the case of ♥(φ1, . . . , φn)
is handled by the existence property. We need only prove the case for Dχ ∈ Σ(φ0), the cases for E and @ then follow via
the axioms (ED) and (E@) respectively.
First suppose Φ | Dχ then there exists a distinct Ψ with Ψ | χ so by induction χ ∈ Φ . Since Φ,Ψ distinct there is
some θ in Φ but not Ψ , moreover ¬θ , χ in Ψ implies E(¬θ ∧ χ) ∈ K and hence all elements of MK . Then notice we
can derive  θ ∧ E(¬θ ∧ χ) → Dχ , hence Dχ in Φ as required. The converse is more diﬃcult and makes use of the extra
formulae we required K to contain. Assume Dχ ∈ Φ and ﬁrst suppose Φ is named i.e. contains some nominal n. Then it
follows that
∧
K ∧ χ ∧ ¬n is consistent, for the contrary together with (i)  D(p ∧ ψ) ↔ Dp ∧ ψ for any global formula ψ
and (ii) @nDχ ∈ K can be shown to contradict K ’s consistency. Therefore by the Lindenbaum lemma we have a distinct Ψ
that contains χ and hence by induction Ψ | χ . On the other hand if Φ is not named then χ = χi for some i (see deﬁnition
of K above) and recall that the formula EDχi → @niχi lies in K , so EDχi ∈ K implies @niχi ∈ K . Hence χi ∧ ni ∧
∧
K is
consistent, so we have a distinct Ψ containing χi because Ψ is named and by assumption Φ isn’t, by induction Ψ | χi . 
Remark 3.18. One can view the paper [10], as providing a semantical characterisation of the endofunctors on Set, the
coalgebras of which can be described by the standard normal modal operator . In such cases the underlying binary
relation →γ ∗ of the coalgebra γ ∗ above satisﬁes the familiar property: ψ ∈ Φ and Φ →γ ∗ Ψ implies ψ ∈ Ψ .
Finally, the global theory K together with any nominal is consistent, hence t0 ∧∧ K is also consistent so there exists
Φ0 ∈ MK named by t0 which contains φ0, so:
Theorem 3.19. If R is one-step cut-free complete then R is complete and by construction we have the small model property.
Example 3.20 (Minimal Relational Logic). In recent work concerning logics of preference and belief revision [7] a particular
underlying logic has emerged, known as minimal relational logic. Over neighbourhood frames γ : X → PP X the following
modalities are introduced:
x |φ ⇐⇒ ∀Y ∈ γ (x).∀y ∈ Y .y | φ
x |φ ⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ γ (x).∀y ∈ Y .y | φ
As deﬁned in Example 2.2, neighbourhood frames are coalgebras of the functor Q ◦ Q. Although one can deﬁne the
standard neighbourhood box, neither  nor  arise as predicate liftings because naturality fails. As mentioned previously,
although coalgebraic modal logic is rather speciﬁc about the modalities that may be deﬁned, one can expect to be able to
enrich the structure of the functor such that these modalities are deﬁnable. Consider the axiomatisation (slightly rewritten)
of these operators as provided in [7]:
(i) (φ → ψ) → (φ →ψ)
(ii) 
(iii) φ →(φ ∨ ψ)
(iv) φ ∧ψ →(φ ∧ ψ)
(v) ¬ →⊥





The ﬁrst two axioms tell us that  has the underlying structure of a relation; note that the congruence rule for  is
derivable from them. Moreover the congruence rule for  and the third axiom informs us that  has at least the structure
of a monotone neighbourhood frame. Thus we shall think of  as the standard Kripke box over a relational structure and
of  as a monotone neighbourhood box. It is worth nothing that if R is one-step complete then the congruence rule for
each modality is admissible: R φ ↔ ψ implies R ♥φ ↔ ♥ψ . They encode the fact that predicate liftings are functions.
Let us now consider the class of models where a relation and monotone neighbourhood frame are deﬁned over the
states X . The remaining axioms (iv) and (v) provide interaction between these structures, (iv) says: if our successors lie in
the semantics of φ and our monotone neighbourhood contains the semantics of ψ then this neighbourhood also contains
their intersection; (v) says: if the monotone neighbourhood fails to contain  (i.e. it is empty) then there are no successors.
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P X × MX where we restrict to objects (S,N) ∈ T X such that (i) if N = ∅ then S = ∅ and (ii) if Y ∈ N then S ∩ Y ∈ N . That
this really is a (sub)functor follows because these properties are preserved by T -coalgebra morphisms, as one can check.
Then we take as our new semantics the category of MR -coalgebras upon which the modal operators  and  now
arise as natural transformations , : Q → Q ◦MR , where X (Y ) = {(S,N) ∈ MR X: S ⊆ Y } and X (Y ) = {(S,N) ∈
MR X: Y ∈ N}. These may be understood as restrictions of the standard relational and neighbourhood box respectively. Fixing
our transition type MR and predicate liftings yields the following hybrid language:
φ  F(Λ) ::= p | n | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 |φ |φ |@nφ | Eφ | Dφ
One can now interpret these formulae in MR -coalgebras using the hybrid coalgebraic semantics. However one can also
interpret them in the original neighbourhood semantics, via the following correspondence:
Given a neighbourhood frame γ : X → PP X deﬁne a MR -coalgebra f (γ ) : X → MR X by setting f (γ )(x) = (S,N) where
S =⋃γ (x) and N = {Y ⊆ X: ∃A ∈ γ (x).A ⊆ Y } i.e. the up-set of γ (x). Conversely given a MR -coalgebra δ : X → MR X
where δ(x) = (S,N) deﬁne the neighbourhood frame g(δ) : X → PP X by g(δ)(x) = {S ∩ Y : Y ∈ N}.
Lemma 3.21. For any neighbourhood model M = (X, γ ,π) its translation M ′ = (X, f (γ ),π) satisﬁes: ∀x ∈ X and ∀φ ∈ F(Λ),
(M, x) | φ ⇐⇒ (M ′, x) | φ . The same relationship holds between MR -coalgebras M = (X, δ,π) and their translation M ′ =
(X, g(δ),π).
Proof. By induction over the structure of φ. We only consider the cases for the modal operators. Given a neighbour-
hood model M = (X, γ ,π) let f (γ ) = (S,N). Then (M, x) | φ ⇐⇒ γ (x) ∈ X (φM) ⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ γ (x).Y ⊆ φM ⇐⇒
φM ∈ N ⇐⇒ f (γ )(x) ∈ X (φM′ ) ⇐⇒ (M ′, x) |φ. For the second translation take a MR -model M = (X, δ,π) and let
δ(x) = (S,N) and N∗ = g(δ)(x). Then (M, x) |φ ⇐⇒ δ(x) ∈ XφM ⇐⇒ S ⊆ φM ⇐⇒ ∀Y ∈ g(δ)(x).Y ⊆ φM′ ⇐⇒
g(δ)(x) ∈ X (φM′ ) ⇐⇒ (M ′, x) |φ. 
Hence relative to the observations one can make using the hybrid formulae from F(Λ), these classes of models are
identical: any neighbourhood frame can be understood as a MR -coalgebra and conversely.








i=1 ai → b∧n
i=1ai →b ∨ θ ()
∧n
i=1 ai ∧ b → c∧n
i=1ai ∧b →c
In (⊥), θ is either c or ¬ c, note c doesn’t occur in the premise; also in all rules n 0. One can check that these are
one-step sound and that they allow us to derive the axioms. In fact this collection of rules is one-step cut-free complete.
In order to verify this, the reader is encouraged to show that for every set X and every ψ one-step valid relative to some
τ : P → P X , there exists a single rule Γ1
Γ0
with (i) (X, τ ) |∨Γ1 and (ii) ∨Γ0 is a subclause of ψ . Here ψ will be a
clause with literals of the form a,¬a,a or ¬ a for a ∈ P. Since this ruleset R is one-step cut-free complete, by the
above theorem R is complete with respect to its hybrid coalgebraic semantics and hence also its original semantics as
neighbourhood frames.
4. Translation, cut elimination and termination
For any notion of transition T : Set → Set and coalgebraic modal operators Λ, there exists a one-step cut-free complete
ruleset, see Lemma 3.8. One might think of Λ as providing a particular way of observing T -coalgebra transitions. Thus for
any choice of T and Λ we can completely axiomatise their hybrid coalgebraic semantics and in particular, if we explicitly
provide a one-step complete ruleset R then R provides a complete axiomatisation. We now introduce a generic sequent
system, parametric in a given one-step complete ruleset R.
A sequent Γ is a multiset of @-preﬁxed formulae from F(Λ) where the commas should be thought of as disjunctions. In
the tradition of the sequent calculus we now use capital Roman letters A, B, . . . to represent formulas in F(Λ), rather than
lowercase Greek letters. We use capital Greek letters Γ,Δ, . . . for arbitrary sequents. If A ∈ F(Λ) is a clause ∨ni=1 Ai then
A1, . . . , An is its respective sequent. The generic sequent system consists of the following axioms and rules:
(Ax) @t¬A,@t A,Γ (Ref) @tt,Γ (@) @t,Γ
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@t¬¬A,Γ (∧)
@t A,Γ @t B,Γ
@t(A ∧ B),Γ
(¬∧) @t¬A,@t¬B,Γ
















where, in rules marked by ∗ the nominal s must occur as a subformula of the conclusion. In rules marked by + the nominal
s must not occur as a subformula of the conclusion.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Suppose R is a set of one-step rules, then we deﬁne the provability predicate SR over sequents as the least
set such that it:
• contains all instances of the axioms given above
• is closed under all the rules presented above
• if R ∈ R where R = Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 it is closed under its sequent translation:
(@R)
@nΓ1σ ,@tΓ0σ ,Δ · · · @nΓnσ ,@tΓ0σ ,Δ
@tΓ0σ ,Δ
where n does not occur in the conclusion, σ is an arbitrary language substitution and Δ is an arbitrary sequent.




we obtain the proof system SR+C . We will also write S or S+C , leaving the ruleset R implicit.
Example 4.2. For the canonical example of the minimal normal modal logic K , the sequent translation of its one-step




where n does not occur in the conclusion, ¬A denotes ¬A1, . . . ,¬Am , similarly ¬A denotes ¬A1, . . . ,¬Am and m 0.
When we attempt backwards proof-search we call our initial sequent the endsequent and any particular stage of this
search a pseudo-derivation. Any maximal path from the endsequent to a leaf sequent is called a branch. If its leaf is not an
axiom and there are no rules we may (backwards) apply to it we call the branch saturated.
For the fragment not containing E or D, we have shown in previous work [15] that our sequent system is complete by
translating Hilbert proofs R φ0 into proofs in our sequent system SR+C @tφ0 where t does not occur in φ0. Moreover we
have also proven cut-elimination and that validity of formulae in that fragment may be checked in PSPACE. By extensions
of these arguments one can show (i) cut-freeness for the full language above and (ii) termination in the absence of the
difference modality. We now list various nice properties enjoyed by our system and sketch the proof of (i) and (ii).
Lemma 4.3. Various properties of S :
(i) Soundness: S Γ implies |∨Γ
(ii) S is closed under weakening and uniform substitution, preserving the depth of the proof
(iii) Inversion lemmas (see [26]) hold for (¬¬), (∧), (¬∧), (At), (Sd) and (Eq)
(iv) One may translate a proof R φ0 into a proof S+C @tφ0 where t doesn’t occur in φ0 .
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the premises of rules will need to be renamed, also (Eq) requires some manipulation. In the case of (iv) one ﬁrst translates
the axioms and then shows how to simulate the other rules, making use of cut, closure under weakening and the inversion
lemmas. 
Remark 4.4. We don’t have depth-preserving inversion because we do not restrict the axiom (Ax) to propositional atoms,
unlike in [26]. If we restricted (Ax) to atoms then we wouldn’t be able to prove depth-preserving closure under uniform
substitution, which we use to prove cut-elimination.
We prove closure under contraction and cut simultaneously. The part of the proof concerning cut-elimination is handled
by requiring that R is one-step cut-free complete, however we need an additional condition on R to ensure closure under
contraction, which we deﬁne in terms of the Hilbert system:
Deﬁnition 4.5. The set R of one-step rules is contraction closed if, for all rules Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 and all renamings σ : P → P such
that σ identiﬁes two literals in Γ0 (i.e. σ(a) = σ(b) and either l1 = ♥a, l2 = ♥b or l1 = ¬♥a, l2 = ¬♥b) then there exists a









Γ ′i ρ , (ii)
∨
Γ ′0ρ is a subclause of
∨
Γ0σ .
Fortunately one can always force a ruleset to be contraction closed by iteratively adding new rules [25]. In fact all the
examples in Example 3.2 in addition to being one-step cut-free complete are also contraction closed. Examples where this
closure is necessary include logics for multigraphs and Markov chains.
In the previous section we used one-step cut-free completeness to prove completeness. In fact we noted that one-step
completeness was already enough for completeness, but chose to use the cut-free condition because we would need it later
when analysing our sequent system. The following deﬁnition and lemma helps to clarify the close connection between
one-step cut-free completeness and the elimination of certain special cuts.
Deﬁnition 4.6. The rule set R is cut closed if, whenever we have two rules Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 and Δ1 . . .Δk/Δ0 and two renamings
σ ,ρ : P → P such that A ∈ Γ0σ and ¬A ∈ Δ0ρ , there exists a rule Σ1 . . .Σl/Σ0 and a renaming τ : P → P such that (i)∧n
i=1
∨
Γiσ ∧∧kj=1 Δ jρ →∧li=1 Σiτ and (ii) ∨Σ0τ →∨Ξ are propositional tautologies where Ξ = Γ0σ ,Δ0ρ \ {A,¬A}
is the result of applying cut on A to Γ0σ and Δ0ρ .
The underlying subject of this deﬁnition is the elimination of an application of the cut rule to the conclusions of two
one-step rules. In such a situation we can assume the two one-step rules have disjoint propositional variables and modify
our language substitutions accordingly. Instead of performing cuts on the conclusions, we’d like to replace the 3 rules: two
substitution instances of the one-step rules φ/ψ , φ′/ψ ′ and the cut rule applied to their conclusions, by a single rule,
namely a substitution instance of a one-step rule φ′′/ψ ′′ . In order that this doesn’t break the proof we must be able to
(i) use the proofs of the premises of the φ/ψ and φ′/ψ ′ substitution instances to prove the premise of the substitution
instance of φ′′/ψ ′′ and (ii) use the conclusion of the substitution instance of φ′′/ψ ′′ to prove the conclusion of the cut rule.
A cut closed ruleset R allows such local surgery on proofs.
Lemma 4.7. (See [25, Theorem 3.17].) If R is one-step cut-free complete and one-step sound, then it cut closed.
Proof. Suppose that Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 and Δ1 . . .Δk/Δ0 are one-step rules and σ ,ρ : P → P are renamings so that A ∈ Γ0σ and
¬A ∈ Δ0ρ . Take C to be the set of all valuations θ : P → {,⊥} under which all Γiσ (i = 1, . . . ,n) and all Δ jρ ( j = 1, . . . ,k)
evaluate to . Deﬁne a valuation τ : P → P(C) by τ (p) = {θ ∈ C | θ(p) = }. It follows that Γiσ(C,τ ) = Δ jρ(C,τ ) = C
whence (T X, τ ) | Γ0σ and (T X, τ ) | Δ0ρ by one-step soundness. In particular, (T X, τ ) | Ξ for Ξ = Γ0σ ,Δ0ρ \ {¬A, A}.
By one-step completeness, we can ﬁnd a rule Σ1 . . .Σl/Σ0 and a substitution α : P → P so that (C, τ ) | Σiα (i = 1, . . . , l)
and Σ0α ⊆ Ξ is a subclause. By construction, we obtain propositional tautologies ∧ni=1∨Γiσ ∧∧kj=1∨Δ jρ → Σmα for
all m = 1, . . . , l witnessing closure under cut. 
We can now sketch the simultaneous proof of contraction and cut-elimination.
Theorem 4.8. Let R be one-step cut-free complete and contraction closed then SR is closed under contraction and cut is eliminable.
Proof. The cut-elimination proceeds via a triple induction over the modal rank of the endsequent, the depth of the proof
tree and the size of the cut-formula, as was used in [15]. One shows: (i) when at least one of the premises in a cut is an
axiom we may eliminate the cut (ii) when the cut formulae is not principal in at least one of its two premise then the
depth of the cut in at least one of its premises can be reduced and (iii) when the cut formula is principal in both premises
it may be replaced by a number of cuts, either with premises of lesser depth or using a cut formula of a smaller size.
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However one may need to apply cuts a large number of times on these premises, hence these cuts can occur deeper in the
proof. Thankfully, due to the structure of one-step rules, the cut formulae in such cuts have a strictly smaller modal rank
and thus may be eliminated via the triple induction. Also proving contraction is mostly straightforward via the invertibility
lemmas, however the (@R) rules require special attention when the contraction occurs principally. In such cases we apply
contraction closure of R, again this will require propositional reasoning via cut amongst premises but as before the cut-
formulae all have strictly smaller rank and hence are eliminated by the triple induction. 
One can check that principal cuts using the new rules (E) and (¬E) and similarly (D) and (¬D) are eliminable, the
other additional cases introduced by these new rules are standard. In these cases depth-preserving closure under uniform
substitution (of nominals) is required.
We provide an example proof of the axiom p → p ∨ Dp in the sequent system SR , where we use the ruleset for the
minimal normal modal logic K . In our system a → b and a are deﬁned connectives ¬a ∨ b and ¬¬a respectively. Thus
after rewriting and preﬁxing by @t we obtain @t(¬¬¬p ∨ (p ∨ Dp)):
Before providing restrictions on proof-search ensuring termination in the absence of the difference modality, we must
introduce auxiliary concepts from [2,3].
Deﬁnition 4.9.
(i) Along any branch Θ of a pseudo-derivation one can deﬁne a nominal tree i.e. a partial order <Θ deﬁned over the
nominals that occur in Θ . Set t <Θ n if there exists an (@R) rule in Θ where t is the principal nominal in the conclusion
and n is the principal nominal in the premise. One then takes the transitive closure.
(ii) Along any branch Θ one deﬁnes another partial order ⊆Θ on the nominals that occur on any branch Θ by: i ⊆Θ j iff
for every formula @iψ that occurs in Θ , @ jψ also occurs on Θ .
The terminating proof-search strategy is provided in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.10. Every provable sequent Γ ∈ S(Λ) that doesn’t mention the difference modality has a proof where (i) the (¬E) rule
may only be applied once and (ii) along every branch Θ the rules (@R) and (E):
• may only be applied to the same principal subsequent once
• are only applied to maximal nominals in the ⊆Θ ordering.
Under these restrictions, every branch that can be constructed by backwards application of proof rules is ﬁnite, i.e. proof search in this
restricted system is terminating.
Proof (Sketch). We have a pseudo-subformulae property: any @iψ occurring in the proof search has ψ ≡ χ [i1 := j1] . . . [in :=
jn] (n  0) where χ is a possibly negated subformula of the endsequent and every ir , jr is a nominal in the endsequent.
This may be proved by induction over the proof system and establishes that there are at most ﬁnitely many formulae that
can occur under any particular satisfaction operator @i .
The rule (¬E) only ever needs to be applied once. If we ﬂip the rules and view the sequent system as a tableau, then this
rule asserts the existence of a state where a formula holds and we need only create one such state. Next, along any branch
Θ we only apply the rules (@R) and (E) to the maximal nominals on the branch relative to the ordering ⊆Θ . This technique
is often referred to in the literature as loop-checking. It can be shown to preserve completeness and moreover ensures that
the nominal tree has ﬁnite depth – for if not one acquires a contradiction via the pseudo-subformulae property [3].
Finally in order to ensure that the nominal tree along our arbitrary branch Θ is ﬁnite, we must also show that it is
ﬁnitely branching. One can show that along Θ , (@R) and (E) need only ever be applied to a particular subsequent once.
Given a proof where they occur twice along Θ , one may manipulate said proof to remove the duplicate occurrence. Again
applying the pseudo-subformulae property it follows that any particular nominal may only branch ﬁnitely many times via
(@R). Since it follows that the nominal tree <Θ along any branch Θ is ﬁnite we obtain termination. 
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<Θ and quotient it under the reﬂexive-transitive closure of the relation: Ri j ⇐⇒ @i¬ j ∈ Θ or @ j¬i ∈ Θ . In order to ﬁnd
the coalgebra structure over it one considers not only the formulae @i p,@i¬p ∈ Θ , which provide us with the propositional
valuation, but also the boxed formulae @i♥(φ1, . . . , φn),¬♥(φ1, . . . , φn) ∈ Θ which deﬁne the transition structure. We leave
a more explicit description of its construction until another time, it essentially generalises the shallow model construction
presented in [25]. All the rulesets presented in this paper are one-step cut-free complete. We invite the reader to ensure
their contraction closure, construct their sequent translation and then attempt to prove the negation @t¬φ0 of some known
satisﬁable formula φ0. One should be able to decode a model from a saturated branch.
5. Compositionality by example
In Section 2, we have introduced a T -coalgebra as a pair (C, γ ) where C is a set and γ : C → T C is a (transition) function.
Clearly this deﬁnition is parametric in the endofunctor T : Set → Set that deﬁnes the type of transitions, and we have
described a general setup for logics interpreted over T -coalgebras. In particular, this level of generality allows us to consider
composition of (type) functors without leaving the coalgebraic framework: given two functors S, T : Set → Set, we can of
course consider S ◦ T -coalgebras (C, γ : C → S(T (C))). It is best to think of S ◦ T -coalgebras as describing sequencing of two
transition types. If, say, T X is the set of ﬁnitely supported probability distributions over the set X and SY are the possible
outcomes of one round of a strategic game with board Y , we may conceive S ◦ T -coalgebras as models of strategic games
with uncertainty, as we see not outcomes of strategic games, but rather probability distributions over possible outcomes.
Given that we know how to construct a modal logic for both ingredients (probabilities and strategic games) separately, it is
of course legitimate to ask how this can be used to obtain a logic for games with uncertainty.
This question has been studied both from a logical and algorithmic perspective [5,23] where complete Hilbert-style proof
systems and decision procedures, respectively, are synthesised, but hybrid extensions are not taken into account.
On the other hand, the only ingredient that is necessary to obtain complete and terminating sequent systems is a one-
step cut-free axiomatisation. In other words, if we construct a one-step cut-free axiomatisation of S ◦ T -coalgebras from an
axiomatisation of the ingredients, completeness and termination, even in presence of hybrid features, are automatic. Rather
than (re-)developing a theory of compositionality for coalgebraic logics, we present an extended example that shows how a
logic for strategic games can be extended to cover quantitative uncertainty.
Throughout the section, we ﬁx a set A of agents, or players in a strategic game, and write
D(X) =
{
μ : X → [0,1]




for the set of ﬁnitely supported probability distributions over a set X . The set of outcomes of strategic games over a set Y








where we think of Sa as the set of strategies available to each agent a ∈ A, and of f :∏a∈A Sa → X as an outcome function
that delivers a new state of the game board, given a choice of strategy by every agent.
It is straightforward to extend both D and G to functors of type Set → Set. This allows us to model strategic games
as coalgebras (C, γ : C → GC) where each position c ∈ C of the game board comes equipped with a set of strategies for
the individual agent, and a function that delivers a new state of the board. Using functor composition, strategic games
with uncertain outcomes can now be modelled as G ◦ D-coalgebras (C, γ : C → G ◦ D(C)). Spelling out the deﬁnitions, the
transition map γ associates with every state c ∈ C (which we think of as a position in a strategic game) a family (Sa)a∈A of
available strategies and a probability-distribution valued outcome function f :∏a∈A Sa → D(C). As a consequence, we only
have probabilistic knowledge about the next state of the game board.
From the perspective of the individual logics, we use Pauly’s coalition logic [20] which has modal operators [C] for every
subset (thought of as a coalition) of agents, where we read [C]φ as “coalition C has a collaborative strategy to achieve φ”.




) ∈ GX ∣∣ ∃(sa)a∈C∀(sa)a∈A\C ( f (sa)a∈A) ∈ H)}
that expresses the existence of a choice of strategies of the agents in C such that – irrespective of the choices of the other
agents – the position assigned by the outcome function will lie in the set H (of positions). We note that coalition logic
can be equipped with a one-step cut-free aximatisation [17], the precise form of which is inconsequential for our present
purpose.
For probabilistic modal logic, we choose the modal operators Lp (for p ∈ [0,1] ∩ Q) with the reading “with probability
at least . . .”. Interpreted over probabilistic frames, that is, D-coalgebras, the semantics of probabilistic modal logic is then
induced by the predicate liftings








Again, we refrain from spelling out a one-step cut-free complete axiomatisation which is readily adapted from what is
called strictly one-step complete in [25] by replacing rule premises with their conjunctive normal form. We now turn
to the combination of both logical features, interpreted over probabilistic game frames, construed as G ◦ D-coalgebras.
Every application of the transition function of a G ◦ D-coalgebra provides us with strategies and a probability distribution-
valued outcome function. Syntactically, this insinuates that we should speak about G ◦D-coalgebras using operators that are
built from an outermost coalitional operator that uses operators from probabilistic modal logic to describe the uncertainty
embodied by the outcome function. For instance, the formula
[C](Lp A ∧ L1−q¬A)
describes the situation where coalition C has a strategy to achieve an outcome A with a probability between p and q
inclusive. As this example shows, we generally need propositional combinations of probabilistic operators to be able to
specify enough detail about the (probabilistic) outcome function.
In our example, a modal operator for games with uncertainty therefore consists of an outermost modality of coalition
logic, applied to a propositional combination of probabilistic operators. The general deﬁnition is as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.1. Suppose that Λ,Σ are modal similarity types. The propositional combination Λ ◦Σ contains the k-ary opera-
tors
♥(Φ1, . . . ,Φn)
where ♥ ∈ Λ is n-ary and Φ1, . . . ,Φn ∈ Prop(Σ({p1, . . . , pk})) for all k 0.
The propositional combination of two structures T and U for Λ and Σ , respectively, consists of the endofunctor T ◦ S ,
together with the predicate liftings
♥(Φ1, . . . ,Φn)X (A1, . . . , Ak) = ♥U X
(
Φ1U X,τ , . . . ,ΦnU X,τ
)
where τ : V → P(X) is the valuation pi → Ai .
This formalises that a modality type of the similarity type Λ ◦ Σ consists of an outermost Λ-modality, applied to a
propositional combination of Σ-modalities. We obtain a Λ ◦ Σ-structure by composing the associated endofunctors, where
the predicate liftings arise by applying the interpretation of the outermost lifting ♥, evaluated at U X , to the one-step
semantics ΦiT X,τ of Φi with respect to U . Note that ♥U X is a mapping of type P(U X)n → P(TU X) and ΦiU X,τ ⊆
U X .
We remark that the ensuing hybrid language can alternatively be constructed using a two-sorted approach that distin-
guishes between coalitional and probabilistic states. This approach has been followed in [5,23] for the case without hybrid
extensions, which requires slightly more technical machinery and breaks the symmetry between (in this case) probabilistic
and coalitional operators, as e.g. nominals and satisfaction operators can only be used on the level of coalitional operators.
Completeness and cut-elimination for the hybrid logic of games with uncertainty now hinge on the availability of a
one-step cut-free complete rule set that we now set out to construct. Intuitively, to establish a sequent [C1]Φ1, . . . , [Ck]Φk
we ﬁrst apply a rule of coalition logic to obtain premises in terms of Φ1, . . . ,Φk , followed by propositional rules to de-
construct the Φi before we can apply a probabilistic rule. Here, the de-construction of a propositional formula is a set of
atomic sequents that suﬃce to establish the formula in the sequent calculus – this process is usually called saturation, and
introduced next.
Deﬁnition 5.2. The saturation sat(Γ ) ⊆ P(W ∪¬W ) of a set Γ ⊆ Prop(W ) of propositional formulas over a set W of atoms
is given by
sat(Δ) =
{ {Δ} if Δ ⊆ W ∪ ¬W is consistent
∅ if Δ ⊆ W ∪ ¬W is inconsistent
sat(A ∧ B,Γ ) = sat(A,Γ ) ∪ sat(B,Γ )
sat(¬¬A,Γ ) = sat(A,Γ )
sat
(¬(A ∧ B),Γ )= sat(¬A,¬B,Γ )
where Δ is inconsistent, if {¬w,w} ⊆ Δ for some w ∈ W .
It is straightforward to see that saturation is actually well deﬁned, and moreover preserves and reﬂects validity.
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have X, τ | Γ iff X, τ | Δ for all Δ ∈ sat(Γ ).
Proof. Well-deﬁnedness follows as application of different clauses of the propositional deconstruction distribute over one
another and eliminate at least one propositional connective. The second statement follows by inspecting the different clauses
in the deﬁnition of saturation. 
We can now deﬁne the composition of rule sets by interspersing propositional reasoning within rule applications. The
presentation of the combination of rule sets beneﬁts from the following notation. If X is a set and Ψ,Ψ ′ ⊆ P(X ∪ ¬X), we
put Ψ ′  Ψ if there exists a surjection e : Ψ → Ψ ′ such that Γ ⊆ e(Γ ) for all Γ ∈ Ψ . In other words, Ψ ′ arises from Ψ by
weakening each of the clauses contained in Ψ . We write Wk(Ψ ) = {Ψ ′ | Ψ ′  Ψ } for the set of all possible weakenings of Ψ .
Deﬁnition 5.4. If R and S are sets of one-step rules over similarity types Λ and Σ , respectively, their composition R ◦ S
contains all rules
Δ11σ1, . . . ,Δ
1
k1
σ1, . . . ,Δ
n





where σ1, . . . , σn : V → V and τ : V → Prop(Σ(V )) are substitutions, for which we can ﬁnd rules




, . . . ,




∈ S and Γ1, . . . ,Γk
Γ0
∈ R
such that {Δ10σ1, . . . ,Δn0σn} ∈ Wk(sat(Γ1τ ) ∪ · · · ∪ sat(Γkτ )).
In other words, the saturation of a set of propositional formulas arises by applying propositional sequent rules back-
wards until the level of atoms is reached. The composition of two rule sets comes about by ﬁrst applying an R-rule to
the conclusion, deconstructing the premises via propositional sequent rules, and then applying an S-rule, and possibly an
instance of weakening, to each remaining sequent. The intermediate weakening step mirrors the fact that – for cut-free
complete rule sets – the conclusion is only required to be a subset of the sequent under consideration. Put differently, we
use propositional reasoning, combined with weakening, to provide the glue between both rule sets.
It is easy to see that this construction preserves one-step soundness.
Proposition 5.5. Suppose that R and S are sets of one-step rules over similarity types Λ and Σ , respectively. If R and S are one-step
sound with respect to structures T and U , respectively, then R ◦ S is one-step sound for T ◦ U .
Proof. Consider the rule Δ11σ1, . . . ,Δ
1
k1
σ1, . . . ,Δ
n
1σn, . . . ,Δ
n
kn




i = 1, . . . ,n and a rule Γ1, . . . ,Γk/Γ0 as required in the deﬁnition of R ◦ S . Assume we have renamings σi : V → V and
a substitution τ : V → Prop(Σ(V )) as required by the deﬁnition. Now let X be a set and ρ : V → P(X) a valuation such
that X,ρ | Δ ji σi for all i = 1, . . . ,n and all j = 1, . . . ,ki . By one-step soundness of S , this entails that U X,ρ | Δi0σi . This
entails that U X,ρ | Σ for all Σ ∈ sat(Γ1τ ) ∪ · · · ∪ sat(Γkτ ). By Lemma 5.3 we obtain U X,ρ | Γiτ for all i = 1, . . . ,k.
Applying one-step soundness of R at the set Y = U X establishes the claim. 
Crucially, this construction preserves one-step cut-free completeness.
Proposition 5.6. Suppose R and S are one-step rules over similarity types Λ and Σ , respectively. If R and S are one-step cut-free
complete with respect to structures T and U , respectively, then R ◦ S is one-step cut-free complete with respect to T ◦ U .
Proof. Suppose that Γ ⊆ (Λ ◦ Σ)V ∪ ¬(Λ ◦ Σ)V and τ : V → P(X) is a valuation such that (T ◦ U )X, τ | Γ . We may
assume that Γ = 1♥1(Φ1)(p1), . . . , k♥k(Φk)(pk) where i stands for either nothing or negation, the Φ i are tuples of
propositional formulas over Σ(V ) according to the arity of ♥i and pi are tuples of propositional variables according to the
arity of ♥i(Φi) for all i = 1, . . . ,k. Now assume that Φ i = (Φ1i , . . . ,Φlii ) and consider the set Y = U X and the valuation
τˆ : V → P(Y ) given by q ji → Φ ji U X,τ . If Γˆ = i♥1(q11, . . . ,ql11 ), . . . , k♥k(q1k , . . . ,qlnk ) we have that Γ (T◦U ),τ = Γˆ T Y ,τˆ .
Hence T Y , τˆ | Γˆ , and, by one-step completeness of R we ﬁnd a rule r ≡ Γ1, . . . ,Γl/Γ0 and a renaming ρ so that Γ0ρ ⊆ Γˆ
and Y , τˆ | Γiρ for all i = 1, . . . , l. Note that Γ0τ0 ⊆ Λ(V ). Now consider the substitution θ(q ji ) = Φ ji . Then Γ0ρθ ⊆ Γ and
Y , τ | Γiρθ as every variable that appears in the premise of a one-step rule also appears in the conclusion. By Lemma 5.3
we have that Y , τ | Δ for all Δ ∈ D = sat(Γ1ρθ) ∪ · · · ∪ sat(Γlρθ). Notice that Γiρθ ⊆ Prop(Σ(V )) and hence all Δ ∈ D
are subsets of Σ(V ) ∪ ¬Σ(V ). As Y = U X , we have U X, τ | Δ for all Δ ∈ D . Again by one-step cut-free completeness,
this time of S with respect to U , we can ﬁnd, for all Δ ∈ D , a rule rΔ ≡ ΔΔ, . . . ,ΔΔm /ΔΔ and a substitution σΔ such1 Δ 0
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ΔΔi σΔ for all i = 1, . . . ,mΔ . We have shown that all premises ΔΔi are valid with respect to X, τ and have Γ0ρθ ⊆ Γ by
construction, hence r witnesses one-step cut-free completeness of R ◦ S . 
As a consequence, the scope of our method extends to logics that arise as combinations of two similarity types, each
of which is equipped with coalgebraic semantics. While it is in general infeasible to construct one-step cut-free axiomati-
sations for a combination of logics from given rule sets by hand, this process is readily performed algorithmically: given a
representation of a cut-free axiomatisation of rule sets R and S , we can construct a representation of R ◦S . What we have
in mind is the following:
Deﬁnition 5.7. Suppose that R is a set of one-step rules over a modal similarity type Λ. A representation of R is a set-
indexed collection of function
(




f (Γ ) = {{Γ1σ . . .Γnσ } ∣∣ Γ0/Γ1 . . . Γn ∈ R, σ : V → S, Γ0σ = Γ }
for all Γ ∈ Λ(S).
In other words, a representation of R is a function that – given a set of Λ-preﬁxed formulas – returns the set of all
substituted rule conclusions with premise Γ – which is precisely what we need if we were to implement backward proof
search. We think of a representation as a polymorphic function that can be applied independently of the nature of formulas
to which Λ-modalities are applied. As a ﬁrst sanity check, we show that this deﬁnition of representation indeed yields
a polymorphic family of functions, that is to say that representations are stable under injective renamings. In categorical
terms, this amounts to representations being natural transformations of type Λ → P ◦P where both Λ and P are functors
on the category of sets with injective functions.
Lemma 5.8. Suppose ρ : S → S ′ is an injective function and f is a representation of a set R of one-step rules. If Λ(ρ) : Λ(S) ∪
¬Λ(S) → Λ(S ′) ∪ ¬Λ(S ′) is the mapping deﬁned by ♥(s1, . . . , sn) → ♥(ρ(s1), . . . , ρ(sn)) then f S ′ ◦ Λ(ρ) = PP( f ) ◦ f S where
P( f ) denotes taking direct image.
Proof. Let Ψ ∈ PP f ◦ f S (Γ ) for some Γ ⊆ Λ(S)∪¬Λ(S). Then there exists a rule Γ1 . . . ΓnΓ0 ∈ R and a renaming σ : P → S
such that Γ0σ = Γ and
Ψ = {P f (Γ1σ), . . . ,P f (Γnσ)}
To show that Ψ ∈ f S ′ ◦Λ( f )(Γ ) we use the same rule with substitution σ ′ = f ◦σ . Now let Ψ ∈ f S ′ ◦Λ( f )(Γ ). In this case,
we again have a rule Γ0/Γ1 . . . Γn ∈ R and a substitution σ ′ : P → S ′ such that Γ0σ = Λ( f )(Γ ) and Ψ = {Γ1σ ′, . . . ,Γnσ ′}.
Since f is assumed to be injective, there’s a one-sided inverse f ′ : S ′ → S ′ such that f ′ ◦ f is the identity on S . Note that
– by virtue of Γ1 . . . Γn/Γ0 being a one-step rule – all literals that occur in one of the Γiσ ′ (i = 1, . . . ,n) also occur in
Λ( f )(Γ ) and are hence in the image of f . We can therefore pick the same rule, together with the substitution σ = f ′ ◦ σ ′
to witness that Ψ ∈ PP( f ) ◦ f S (Γ ). 
We note for the categorically minded reader that, in general, representations as deﬁned above fail to be natural unless
the category of sets is equipped with injective maps. This reﬂects the fact that we do not make any assumptions on the rule
sets under scrutiny, and requiring naturality also for non-injective maps would amount to requiring that rule sets absorb
contraction in a stronger sense than required in Deﬁnition 4.5: for all rules and substitutions that duplicate literals in the
conclusion, there exists a new rule/substitution pair with stronger conclusion and weaker premise (in the sense of the
subset relation). Deﬁnition 4.5 only requires this up to propositional reasoning. Rule sets satisfying this (stronger) property
essentially allow us to eliminate contraction independently of cut. This viewpoint is taken, for the case of modal logic
without hybrid features, in [19].
In the light of constructing rule sets for logics that arise as the composition of two sets of one-step rules, we can now
use the above notion of representation to synthesise a representation of combined rule sets, in terms of their constituents.
Proposition 5.9. Suppose that f and g are representations of rule sets R and S over similarity types Λ and Σ , respectively. Then the
family of functions
hS : (Λ ◦ Σ)(S) ∪ ¬(Λ ◦ Σ)(S) → PP(S ∪¬S)
deﬁned by
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{{
gS(Δ)
∣∣Δ ∈ Υ } ∣∣∣ ∃Ψ ∈ fProp(Σ(S)).Υ ∈ Wk
(⋃{
sat(Δ)
∣∣Δ ∈ Ψ })}
is a representation of R ◦ S .
In other words, we can synthesise a representation of a rule set that axiomatises the combination of two logics in terms
of the individual rule sets so that cut-free completeness is preserved (see Proposition 5.6). The proof of the preceding
proposition is a straightforward unfolding of Deﬁnition 5.4 and left to the reader.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that Bolander’s method [3,2] of proving completeness for hybrid tableaux extends to modal
logics way beyond those amenable to relational semantics. Our main results are soundness, completeness for both a Hilbert-
style and a Sequent calculus for hybrid extensions of coalgebraic logic, and we have established termination of proof search
for the fragment without the difference modality. We leave a termination analysis for the full hybrid logics, including the
difference modality, for future work. To emphasise the generality of our method, we have given a single-sorted analysis of
compositionality orthogonal to the method presented in [23].
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